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NOTES 
SECURITIES REGULATION-DAMAGES-The Possibility 
of Punitive Damages as a Remedy for a 
Violation of Rule lOh-5 
According to classical tort theory, "punitive" or "exemplary" 
damages may be awarded when a tortfeasor intentionally injures 
another person in an "outrageous" or "malicious" manner.1 They 
represent an additional award which is given to the victim of a tort 
over and above full compensation for the actual injuries suffered. 
The functions of punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer, 
to deter potential wrongdoers, and to encourage the victim to bring 
the wrongdoer to justice by compensating him for all the incidental 
hardships of bringing suit.2 
Rule IOb-5 of the rules of the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC)3 makes unlawful certain conduct. Since the conduct proscribed 
by that rule can be regarded as constituting an intentional tort, the 
question is raised whether punitive damages are an appropriate 
remedy for a violation of rule IOb-5. 
Several lower federal courts have recently been faced with this 
issue and have reached conflicting results in their attempts to re-
solve it.4 This Note will examine both the problems of statutory 
interpretation and the policy considerations that are involved in 
deciding whether punitive damages should be awarded in civil ac-
tions based on violations of rule IOb-5. 
I. W. PROSSER, THE I.Aw OF TORTS 9 (3d ed. 1964). See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 
U.S. 58 (1896); Kirschbaum v. Lowrey, 165 Minn. 233, 206 N.W. I'll (1925). 
2. w. PROSSER, THE I.Aw OF TORTS 9 (3d ed. 1964). 
3. Rule IOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1969), was adopted by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1942, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1934). The rule provides 
in full: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
4. In Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to award punitive damages, as did federal 
district courts in Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 
and Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966). On the other hand, several 
federal district courts have taken the opposite position and have concluded that puni-
tive damages may be awarded. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham &: Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 




I. THE JUDICIALLY CREATED PRIVATE CML DAMAGE REMEDY 
A hypothetical factual situation will help to illustrate the classic 
setting in which an action based on rule I 0b-5 may arise. Assume 
that the president of a corporation, who is in need of money, issues a 
report that the corporation has suffered grave reversals and will be 
unable to declare any dividends in the foreseeable future. When 
the price of the corporation's stock declines as a result of that report, 
the president buys 1,000 shares of the stock at the depressed price. 
Subsequent to this stock purchase, he issues another report, stating 
that an error in calculation has been discovered or a change of 
fortune has taken place, and that the corporation not only is not 
bankrupt, but will realize record profits during the year. The effect 
of this statement is that the price of the stock quickly rises; and the 
president then sells his shares, reaping a considerable profit. Later 
the false reports are exposed, and the price of the stock sinks back 
to its normal level. 
In this situation, the president has taken advantage of his posi-
tion as an insider in the corporation5 by making fraudulent use of 
the information available to him by virtue of his position. He has 
done so to the detriment both of those who sold him the stock at the 
depressed price and of those who bought it at an inflated value. Yet 
although section 32 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (1934 Act)6 
establishes criminal penalties for persons engaging in such a course 
of conduct in violation of rule IOb-5, that Act does not specifically 
create any right to a civil action for the victims who sold and bought 
the stock at the unnaturally deflated or inflated prices. The federal 
courts, however, have consistently held that a private civil damage 
remedy against the wrongdoer is implied in the 1934 Act.7 The ratio-
nale behind this implied civil damage remedy is that Congress in-
5. Rule IOb-5 applies not only to insiders, that is, to persons having access to con-
fidential information, but to "any person" engaging in prohibited activity. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.I0b-5 (1969). See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966), afjd. in part, revd. in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand, 38 U.S.L.W. 
2458 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1970). 
6. 15 u.s.c. § 78ff (1964). 
7. The first case to establish civil liability under rule IOb-5 was Kardon v. 
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Almost every federal court 
of appeals has expressly approved the Kardon holding. See Fischman 11. Raytheon Mfg. 
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 
(5th Cir. 1960); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); 
Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor &: Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968); Boone v. 
Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Stevens 
v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965). The Kardon holding was implicitly approved 
by the United States Supreme Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See 
also Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule I0b-5, 1968 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 165. See also Note, Insider's Liability Under Rule I0b-5 for the Illegal Purchase 
of Actively Traded Securities, 78 YALE L.J. 864, 867-69 (1969); and Comment Private 
Remedies Available Under Rule I0b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620, 621 (1966). 
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tended the courts to provide a complete arsenal of remedies to 
protect the investor who is harmed by a lOb-5 violation.8 It seems that 
since the courts have inferred this remedy, they must determine the 
extent of the recovery as well. The question then becomes whether 
the courts should permit punitive damages as a part of the implied 
lOb-5 action under the 1934 Act.9 
II. THE BASIS OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION AS A GROUND FOR 
AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THE DEHAAS .APPROACH 
Most courts10 and commentators11 have long assumed that sec-
tion 28(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act12 precludes recovery 
of punitive damages in implied civil damage actions under rule 
I0b-5, on the ground that the Act was remedial rather than penal.13 
As a result, the standard remedy in lOb-5 actions has been limited to 
8. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), in which the court set forth 
the premise that the legislature intends to allow private actions for conduct made 
criminal by statute unless it clearly and plainly expresses a contrary intention, and 
that the courts have a duty to make remedial legislation fully effective. See also Note, 
Insider's Liability Under Rule I0b-5 for the Illegal Purchase of Actively Traded Secu-
rities, 78 YALE L.J. 864, 867-69 (1969). 
9. The courts have frequently permitted punitive damages in areas involving other 
statutes. One example is Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 1160 
(S.D. Cal. 1961). That case involved § 404(6) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 
§ lll74(b) (1964), which makes unjust discrimination unlawful and expressly established 
criminal sanctions and injunctive relief. The court in Wills held that in order to effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act, a private damage remedy would be inferred for a 
passenger whose priority was disregarded when an airline oversold a flight. In addition 
to awarding compensatory damages, the court awarded punitive damages to the pas-
senger on the theory that punitive damages were appropriate to provide additional 
deterrence to wrongdoers and to induce victims to enforce their rights. Private dam-
age remedies have also been inferred for violations of regulations of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, Roosevelt Field, Inc. v. Town of N. Hempstead, 84 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 
1949), and for violations of the Federal Communications Act, Reitmeister v. Reit-
meister, 162 F .2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947). In the securities area, private remedies have been 
inferred not only under rule l0b-5, but also under § 14(a) of the 19114 Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n(a) (1964), for violations of proxy regulations. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 1177 U.S. 
426 (1964); Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961). 
10. In Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 19611), and 
Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 1145, 1164 (D.N.J. 1966), revd. on other grounds, 393 
F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968), the courts stated flatly and simply that punitive damages are 
not recoverable, without really deeming the point worthy of thorough analysis or 
discussion. 
11. See, e.g., Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule l0b-5, 
1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 165, which provides a general discussion of damages under rule 
lOb-5 and presumes that punitive damages are not recoverable. 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964). Section 28(a) provides: 
The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any 
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no 
person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this 
title shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, 
a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained 
of. • • • 
13. Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
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compensation for the actual damages suffered by the injured party.14 
In the recent case of deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Company,15 
however, the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado took the unprecedented action of awarding punitive damages 
in an implied civil damage action brought for violation of rule 
l0b-5. 
In deHaas, an officer of the Empire Petroleum Company made 
factual misrepresentations and omissions in soliciting proxies at a 
time when Empire was in the process of consolidating a profitable, 
partially owned subsidiary with two of its wholly owned, but finan-
cially troubled, subsidiaries. The plaintiffs were stockholders in the 
partially owned subsidiary at the time the misstatements were made. 
After finding that the corporate officer who made the misrepresenta-
tions had violated rule IOb-5,16 the jury returned an award which 
included 5,000 dollars punitive damages against that individual de-
fendant. In a proceeding on defendant's post-trial motion to set aside 
the award of punitive damages, the district court upheld the award 
on the basis of a finding that the officer made the misrepresentations 
knowingly. 
One of the problems with the implied cause of action based on 
rule 1 0b-5 is that it requires judicial delineation not only with respect 
to what damages can be recovered, but also with respect to a statute 
of limitations, defenses, venue, and the posting of security for costs. 
Since Congress did not expressly provide for the 1 0b-5 civil damage 
action, it could not possibly have established these necessary limita-
tions on and qualifications of the basic cause of action. In delimiting 
the IOb-5 civil damage action, then, the question whether section 
28(a) or any other statutory qualification applies turns on the source 
of the cause of action. On the one hand, if the cause of action is 
characterized as arising from common-law principles, then the courts 
should be inclined to follow the common law in defining the limits 
of the action; and if they did so, punitive damages might be granted 
in an appropriate case.17 On the other hand, if the IOb-5 action 
arises under the provisions of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, then 
section 28(a) of that Act would prohibit an award of exemplary 
damages. 
14. For the measure of actual damages in a lOb-5 action, see Note, Insider's Lia-
bility Under Rule I0b-5 for the Illegal Purchase of Actively Traded Securities, 78 
YALE L.J. 864, 875-91 (1969). 
15. 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969). See also 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968) 
(defendant's motion for summary judgment), and 300 F. Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1969) 
(plaintiff's petition for a rescission of the merger). 
16. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 970 (1967), in which the court held that a statement made in the process of a 
merger or consolidation meets the "in-connection-with" test of rule l0b-5. 
17. See text accompanying note 2 supra. 
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The court in deHaas took the view that the IOb-5 action arises 
from general tort principles of the federal common law rather than 
from.the 1934 statute, and consequently that section 28(a) should 
not be applied as a limitation on the action. The court relied on 
Kardon v. National Gypsum Company18 as the leading case on the 
subject of private damage actions for violations of rule IOb-5. It cited 
Kardon for the proposition that "the right to pursue a private claim 
for damages under IOb-5 arises by virtue of the general tort law 
principle that the doing of an act prohibited by statute may give 
rise to an actionable wrong."19 The court then cited Hecht v. Harris, 
Upham & Company;20 the Hecht court had accepted the Kardon 
view and had stated further: 
We are inclined to the view that the restrictive provisions of Sec-
tion 28(a) ... concerning "actual dam.ages" were intended by the 
Congress to apply only to those statutory causes of action which it 
specifically "permitted" in the Acts-but not to other rights of ac-
tion based upon the general law of tortious injury and that ex-
emplary dam.ages could be awarded in the pending action.21 
On the basis of these precedents, the court in deHaas interpreted the 
limitation contained in section 28(a) 
as applying only to claims for relief which are expressly or impliedly 
created by the Act itself. Resting as it does on principles of tort law, 
an action for dam.ages resulting :from violation of I 0b-5 does not 
depend on an express or implied grant of authority in the Act and 
is not limited by the provisions of § 28(a).22 
Having circumvented the prohibition of punitive damages that 
is in section 28(a), the court then reasoned that since some element 
of scienter must be shown in order to establish a l0b-5 violation,23 
such a violation necessarily involves the commission of an inten-
tional tort from which punitive damages can flow, The court recog-
nized that the Second Circuit, in Green v. Wolf Corporation,24 had 
taken the opposite view with regard to the applicability of section 
28(a) and the permissibility of punitive damages. But it then stated: 
18. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
19. 302 F. Supp. at 648-49. See 2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See 
also Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Hecht v. Harris, Upham &: Co., 
283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968). Cf. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
20. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968). 
21. 283 F. Supp. at 445. The court in Hecht, however, while setting down the rule 
in dictum, concluded that punitive damages were not necessary in that case. 
22. 302 F. Supp. at 649. 
23. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text. See also deHaas v. Empire Petro-
leum Co., 302 F. Supp. at 649, citing Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. 
Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964). 
24. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). 
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However, in light of the nature of a private action for damages un-
der IOb-5, and in view of the fact that Congress did not contemplate 
this implied remedy based on federal common law, we conclude that 
it is more reasonable to rule that punitive damages are allowable 
in a case such as the instant one where aggravated scienter is clearly 
shown by the facts.21• 
The deH aa,s case, then, stands for the proposition that the implied 
IOb-5 damage action does not "arise under" the provisions of the 
1934 Act, but rather is based on common-law tort principles. Ac-
cording to this view, section 28(a), applying to actions established 
by the Act, does not affect these common-law tort actions. 
The leading case explicitly holding that punitive damages in 
IOb-5 actions are barred by section 28(a) is Green v. Wolf Corpora-
tion.26 In Green, the plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of the 
corporation's shareholders, alleging that they had been misled into 
purchasing stock at inflated prices by misrepresentations in the cor-
poration's prospectus, which had overstated the amount of cash 
available for distribution to shareholders. The district court granted 
a motion to strike those portions of the complaint alleging a class 
action and seeking punitive damages, and Green appealed from that 
preliminary order. On appeal, then, the court of appeals did not 
decide the merits of the case; and thus although the Second Circuit 
upheld that portion of the order disallowing punitive damages, it 
did not have before it any finding by the trial court of aggravated 
scienter-a finding which the court in deHaa,s deemed necessary for 
an award of punitive damages.27 Nevertheless, the Green court 
adopted the rule that punitive damages are not recoverable in ac-
tions under rule I0b-5, because section 28(a) limits recovery in pri-
vate suits for damages to "actual damage."28 
The court of appeals in Green felt that Congress had not fore-
seen that the 1934 Act would provide the basis for as many private 
actions as it has during the past thirty-six years. The court was also 
concerned that allowing punitive damages could lead to the recovery 
of judgments which are grossly disproportionate to the harm done.29 
The basis of the Second Circuit's holding, however, was that courts 
25. 302 F. Supp. at 649. 
26. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). 
27. See text accompanying note 2 and text accompanying notes 23-25 supra. 
28. Although the court in Green reasoned that several district courts had examined 
the issue and had resolved it in a similar fashion, it could cite only two such cases: 
Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), and Pappas v. 
Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966). 
29. For example, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), 
affd. in part, revd. in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand, 38 U.S.L.W. 2458 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1970), the maximum total insider profit that was obtained in viola-
tion of rule lOb-5 was $600,000. Nevertheless, $2 million in actual damages are being 
sought, and punitive damages are being sought to the extent of $76 million. 
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have gone far beyond the limits of the common law in imposing li-
ability under rule lOb-5 and thus may not import to IOb-5 actions 
all the attributes of common-law fraud, including a possible award 
of punitive damages. In essence, then, the court held that the cause 
of action under rule IOb-5 does not have a common-law basis, but 
rather arises by implication from the 1934 Act itself. This approach 
is in direct conflict with the generally accepted view expressed in 
Kardon30 and Hecht,31 with respect to the origin of the l0b-5 ac-
tion.32 
III. THE JUDICIAL DILEMMA 
In light of this conflict between deHaas and Green, the question 
becomes which court has given the better rationale for its inter-
pretation of the provisions of the 1934 Act. The court in Green con-
strued the Act so as to carry out what it felt to be the purpose of 
section 28(a)-to limit the total amount of recoverable damages to 
the actual damages suffered, while preserving existing remedies out-
side those provided for in the-Act.33 Thus, the court gave effect to 
what it felt was the intent of Congress at the time it enacted the 1934 
Act. It is clear, however, that the courts have gone far in fashioning 
remedies under the Act ever since it first came into existence. The 
only enforcement procedures which are written into the Act provide 
for criminal penalties34 and injunctive relief.35 Yet the most effective 
means of enforcing the mandates of the Act has been the judicially 
created private suit for damages. The courts have generally inferred 
such a remedy because of their conviction that Congress intended 
to make the act as effective as possible.36 Given this judicial policy-
30. See note 7 supra and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 18-19 
supra. 
31. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text. 
32. The holding in Green of the three-judge panel of the Second Circuit that puni-
tive damages cannot be awarded might seem to be inconsistent with the opinion of 
the same court, sitting en bane in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, in which it held 
that the question of remedies should be left to the district court on remand. 401 
F.2d 833, 842-43, 864 (2d Cir. 1968). The holding in Texas Gulf Sulphur, at least 
implicitly, left open the possibility that the district court could grant punitive damages. 
This apparent inconsistency might be explained by the fact that the two judges who 
formed the majority in Green (Chief Judge Lumbard and Judge Kaufman) were dis-
senters in Texas Gulf Sulphur. Moreover, Texas Gulf Sulphur was not a private civil 
damage action, but a suit by the SEC. On remand, the district court awarded the SEC 
an injunction against further violations of rule IOb-5 by the defendants. It also 
ordered the defendants to establish an escrow fund out of which to pay damages 
for any liabilities determined in the private civil damage suits now pending. See note 
94 infra. Nevertheless, the court did not indicate whether the potential liability in 
the pending private civil damage suits could include punitive damages. 38 U.S.L.W. 
2458 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1970). 
33. H. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1934). 
34. 1934 Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78 ff (1964). 
35. 1934 Act § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1964). 
36. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). 
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making based on the intent of Congress, the action taken by the 
court in deHaas in awarding punitive damages can be characterized 
as the next logical step in carrying out congressional intent by fur-
ther effectuating enforcement of the provisions of the 1934 Act. 
Thus, when one looks at the conflicting interpretations of the 
IOb-5 cause of action that were given in deHaas and Green, either 
view seems tenable. Arguably, the l0b-5 cause of action arises both 
from the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act which proscribe 
the wrongful conduct and from the workings of common-law prin-
ciples which establish the cause of action in the first place. Without 
both sources, there could be no implied civil damage action under 
the 1934 Act. The court in deHaas chose to emphasize the common-
law origin, and as a result it could borrow the concept of punitive 
damages from the common-law fraud action. On the other hand, 
Green emphasized the statutory origin, and as a result it could apply 
the section 28(a) limitation on the action. Either of these views con-
cerning the basis of the cause of action seems acceptable, since both 
rest on reasonable, but conflicting, policy premises. But this conflict 
over policy is unfortunate, and the courts should apply one con-
sistent policy concerning the availability of punitive damages in 
IOb-5 actions. 
A. The Application to lOb-5 Suits of Qualifications in the 
Securities Acts Other Than That in Section 28(a) 
One approach that can be followed in deciding which theory of 
the basis of the l0b-5 cause of action is more appropriate, and con-
sequently whether the limitation on damages that is contained in 
section 28(a) should be applied to IOb-5 actions, is to examine 
whether qualifications in other parts of the 1933 and 1934 Securities 
Acts are applied to IOb-5 actions. If the courts, having invented the 
IOb-5 damage remedy, normally apply to such actions the qualifica-
tions that Congress has attached to other securities actions, because 
they view the statute as the basis of the IOb-5 action, then they 
should continue that policy and apply the section 28(a) limitation 
on damages as well.37 
The problem with this approach is that the courts are not con-
sistent in their applications of other statutory qualifications to the 
l0b-5 cause of action. At times they borrow qualifications from other 
provisions of the Securities Acts, and at times they do not. For ex-
ample, while the courts have applied the venue provisions of sec-
tions 11 and 12 of the 1933 Securities Act (1933 Act)38 to IOb-5 ac-
37. The theory is that the same policies which would lead Congress to impose the 
qualification on the cause of action created by one section should lead it to impose 
that qualification on a cause of action created by any other section. 
88. 15 u.s.c. §§ 77k, Z (1964). 
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tions, 89 they have refused to borrow from those same sections the 
requirement of an undertaking for the payment of litigation costs, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees, on the ground that the purpose 
of such a requirement is to restrict litigation, whereas the policy 
behind rule IOb-5, as evidenced by judicial decisions, is to expand 
private actions. 40 In addition, in situations in which express qualifi-
cations could have been borrowed from other provisions of the 1934 
Act itself, this has not been the case.41 It is arguable that if the courts 
had thought that the provisions of the 1934 Act were the sole source 
of the 1 0b-5 damage action and that the policies behind those provi-
sions were applicable to such an action, then they would have felt 
compelled to apply those qualifications. But most courts have ap-
parently accepted the view that the IOb-5 cause of action arises under 
the common law,42 and hence none of the qualifications on the 
actions that are expressly provided for in the 1934 Act have been 
carried over to the IOb-5 implied action. Indeed, the courts have 
generally relied on common-law principles in delimiting the scope 
of the IOb-5 action. In doing so, they have used state statutes of 
limitations,43 held attorneys' fees to be nontaxable,44 and refused to 
require the posting of security for expenses.45 
39. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948). 
See also Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 285, 296 (1963). 
40. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
939 (1961). 
41. For example, § 9 of the 1934 Act, which prohibits manipulation of the price 
of a security to give an appearance of active trading when the security is not actually 
sold, provides two express qualifications on the action: (1) the court may, in its 
discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such a suit, 
and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party 
litigant; (2) the action must be brought within one year after discovery of the viola-
tion and within three years of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964). 
Section 16 of the 1934 Act provides that if any director, officer, or holder of 10% 
of the stock of an issuer exchanges stock in the issues within a six-month period, 
he shall be liable to the issuer for any profits. However, the action must be brought 
within two years after the profit is realized. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). 
Finally, § 18 of the 1934 Act expressly establishes that any person making a false 
statement in a document filed under the Act shall be liable to any person damaged 
by reliance on that statement. There are two qualifications on this action: (1) the ac-
tion must be brought within three years after the violation and within one year 
after discovery of the violation; (2) the court may, in its discretion, require an 
undertaking for the payment of the costs of such a suit, and assess reasonable costs, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant. 15 U.S.C. § 78r{a) 
(1964). 
42. See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra. 
43. Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theaters Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954, 966 (N.D. Ill. 
1952); Glick.man v. Schweick.art & Co., 242 F. Supp. 670, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See 
Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1146, 1153 (1965); 
and Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10b and I0b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing 
the Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 685-86 n.103 (1965). 
44. Chaney v. Western States Title Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Utah 1968). 
45. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 
(1961). 
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Moreover, the courts have sometimes recognized that even if they 
did decide tp apply the qualifications of the 1934 Act to the l0b-5 
action, that decision would cause troublesome problems.46 There 
are certain subjects on which the Act has several provisions; and if 
a l0b-5 suit involved such a subject, the court would have difficulty 
in deciding which provision to apply. For example, section 16 pro-
vides for a two-year statute of limitations on causes of action created 
by that section,47 while sections 9 and 18 provide for a three-year 
statute of limitations on causes of action created by those sections.48 
Similarly, sections 9 and 18 provide authority for a court to require, 
in its discretion, an undertaking for the payment of the costs of a 
suit, and assess reasonable costs against either party to the suit,49 
while section 16 is silent on the subject of costs.50 Thus, if a court 
decided to apply the qu~1 ;S.cations of the 1934 Act to a IOb-5 action, 
it might well have to choose among these sections; and there are no 
guidelines that indicate which section it should follow. 
Therefore, since the courts in IOb-5 actions have-except on the 
question of venue-refused to borrow qualifications from other pro-
visions,151 one would expect that the section 28(a) limitation on 
recovery would similarly not be applied to IOb-5 damage actions. 
Rather the courts could be expected simply to follow the common 
law and to award exemplary damages whenever appropriate, as did 
the court in deHaas. There is, however, one very important con-
sideration which differentiates section 28(a) from sections 9, 16, and 
18. In each of the latter three sections, certain conduct is prohibited, 
specific actions are authorized, and qualifications on the action are 
established. By their very terms, these qualifications apply only to 
the actions specifically established in those sections and make no 
reference to other statutory or common-law actions. Thus, the 
courts' general rule not to apply the qualifications of such sections 
to I0b-5 actions may well be correct as a matter of statutory analysis. 
Section 28(a), on the other hand, is different in that, by its terms, 
it applies to all actions in all sections of the 1934 Act. It states: 
"[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the 
provisions of this title shall recover . . . a total amount in excess of 
his actual damages .... "152 Therefore, when the court in deHaas 
awarded recovery in excess of the actual damages that are allowable 
under the 1934 Act, it seems to have gone against the express con-
46. See, e.g., McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 826 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 939 (1961). 




51. See text accompanying note 38 supra. 
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964) (emphasis added). 
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gressional prohibition in section 28(a), unless the IOb-5 implied 
damage action can be said not to arise "under the provisions" of the 
title itself. This is basically what the court did say in holding that 
the action arose from common-law tort principles and not from 
the "provisions" of the 1934 Act. 
B. Is There a Consistent Congressional Policy? 
Despite the deftness of the court's reasoning in deHaas, the basic 
holding of the case is completely contrary to a fairly clear policy in 
the securities area. of awarding only actual damages. This policy 
against punitive damages is set out not only in section 28(a) of the 
1934 Act, but also in sections 1153 and 1254 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1933, which establish civil remedies against certain 
persons who are responsible for false registration statements or for 
false statements in prospectuses. The recovery under both sections 
11 and 12 is limited to actual damages. Considered collectively, 
these sections establish what appears to be a clear policy against ex-
emplary damages in the securities area. 
The courts may be reluctant to ignore this policy, because in 
cases in which rule I0b-5 and other sections prohibit identical con-
duct, permitting plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in implied 
actions under I0b-5 would put them in a better position than they 
would be in under the expressly authorized actions with specific 
qualifications.55 On the other hand, in an effort to equalize the 
remedies expressly available under the 1933 Act and those implicitly 
available under the 1934 Act,56 the courts have often enabled plain-
tiffs in implied actions to escape qualifications which they would 
face under the express actions covering the same conduct. 57 The 
courts, then, have not been consistent in effectuating the policy of 
applying remedies under the two Securities Acts equally, and hence 
that policy does not afford particularly strong support for denying 
punitive damages on the basis of congressional intent or for the con-
53. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964). It should be noted that § 11 made potential common-law 
liability thereunder so broad that punitive damages would be unthinkable because 
they would impose a burden far beyond the defendant's ability to bear. 
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77l (1964). 
55. See Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 
453, 470-71 (1968). See also 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1787-91 (2d ed. 1961). 
56. See Comment, Punitive Damages Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act: A 
Myopic View of Legislative Intent, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 792, 805 (1969). 
57. See, e.g., Maher v. J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), 
and Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). See also Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 
270 (9th Cir. 1961), in which the court held that the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
implicitly overruled, for purposes of suits under that Act, provisions of the 1933 
Securities Act which listed restrictions on buyer's civil damage remedies, and that 
the 1934 Act thereby equalized the remedies afforded buyers and sellers under the 
two Acts. 
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clusion that the lOb-5 cause of action arises from the provisions of 
the 1934 Act. 
C. The Globus View: No Punitive Damages in the 
Securities Area 
Even though there appears to be a policy in the 1933 and 1934 
Securities Acts against punitive damages, trial courts evidently have 
not viewed that policy as absolute or as binding on them in every 
case. In addition to the deHaas court, another trial court awarded 
punitive damages in a case involving securities. In Globus v. Law 
Research Service, Incorporated,58 the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held that punitive damages 
could be recovered for violations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Securi-
ties Act50 despite the apparent contrary policy of other sections. 
Globus involved a suit by purchasers of corporate stock against 
the president of the corporation and the underwriter of the stock 
issue. The suit charged that the president had issued a circular 
which falsely represented that the corporation still maintained a 
contract with a well-known computer firm, when actually the con-
tract had been terminated and the corporation was engaged in a 
law suit with the computer firm. The purchasers alleged that they 
bought the stock in reliance on the fact that the contract was still 
operative. They produced evidence which showed that both the cor-
poration's president and the underwriter were fully aware of the fact 
that the circular contained false statements, and that they inten-
tionally misled the public because they feared that the true facts 
would have a negative effect on the price of the stock. The district 
court held that both defendants had violated section 17(a) by 
making misleading statements, and it awarded the plaintiffs both 
compensatory and punitive damages on the ground that "wanton 
dishonesty" and a "high degree of moral culpability" had been 
shown. Although the court could not base the award of punitive 
damages on express statutory language, it inferred from an examina-
tion of congressional intent that such an award was proper.60 
58. 287 F. Supp. 188, 193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). The district court's opinion is discussed in 
Davis &: Brown, Developments Under Federal Securities Laws-Barchris and Globus, 
54 IOWA L. R.Ev. 1038, 1043-56 (1969); and Comment, Punitive Damages Under Section 
I7(a) of the Securities A.ct: A Myopic View of Legislative Intent, 15 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 
792 (1969). 
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964), makes unlawful certain fraudulent practices in the 
initial sale of securities. Although § 17 does not provide for an express private damage 
action, the courts have held-similar to their holdings with respect to rule IOb-5-that 
such an action is implied in that section. See Dack v. Shannan, 227 F. Supp. 26, 28-29 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); 3 L. Loss, SEcu-
lUTU:S REGULATION 1784-91 (2d ed. 1961). See also A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD 
'ii 2.5(1), at 41 n.105 (1967). 
60. 287 F. Supp. at 191-94. The court attempted to distinguish § 17(a) of the 1933 
Act from rule l0b-5, which was authorized by the 1934 Act: 
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On appeal to the Second Circuit, however, the district court's 
award of punitive damages was reversed.61 The court of appeals 
based its decision on an interpretation of the function that punitive 
damages would fulfill in the statutory enforcement scheme of the 
1933 Securities Act. It felt that the controlling question was whether 
or not punitive damages are necessary for the effective enforcement 
of the 1933 Act.62 Although conceding that punitive damages would 
fulfill the functions of deterrence and retribution, the court stated 
that under the Securities Acts plaintiffs already possess an extensive 
"arsenal of weapons" which serve to perform those functions. Speci-
fically, the court noted the existence of criminal and administrative 
penalties,63 as well as the psychological deterrent of being branded 
a knowing violator of the law in an industry in which a good name 
and business reputation are crucial. In addition, the court stated 
that private actions often lead to liability for compensatory damages 
which are sizable enough to possess great deterrent effect in them-
selves, particularly in class actions. In this context, it recognized 
that under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,64 a class 
action can be utilized in remedying violations, when the injury to 
a particular individual is not great enough to induce him to initiate 
legal action. According to the court, since the bulk of the recovery 
Although § 28(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), prohibits an award 
of damages "in excess of • • • actual damages on account of the act complained of," 
no such prohibition is found in the 1933 Act ..•. Since the 1934 Exchange Act was 
to apply only to post distribution trading of securities listed on national exchanges, 
issuers could avoid its provisions, at least as far as new issuers were concerned, 
simply by not listing them on such exchanges. In order to avoid such a "strike" 
Congress imposed less burdensome requirements and standards in the 1934 Ex-
change Act upon issuers than those found in §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, which 
could not easily be avoided by issuers, since the 1933 Act dealt with the distribution 
of securities whether or not listed on an exchange, through use of the mails, tele-
phone or any interstate instrumentality or facility. The selective and limited ap-
plicability of § 28(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act was part and parcel to this legisla-
tive design. 
287 F. Supp. at 193-94. This rationale would provide a strong argument against punitive 
damages in lOb-5 actions if it were not for the fact that in 1964, Congress amended the 
1934 Act to make it applicable to any broker or dealer using interstate commerce or the 
mails. 1934 Act § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(0) (1964). Almost all securities sold are now 
covered by rule lOb-5, whether or not the particular company is listed on an exchange. 
Consequently, this rationale for the application of § 28(a) as a bar to punitive damages 
in l0b-5 actions is no longer valid. 
61. 418 F .2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969). 
62. 418 F.2d at 1284. Rather than asking whether punitive damages are necessary, 
a more proper inquiry might have been whether they are appropriate and helpful to 
the Act's enforcement. 
63. The 1933 Act, § 24, provides for a fine and also for five years imprisonment for 
violation of § 17(a). 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964). Moreover, the SEC may suspend or expel 
those who violate the securities laws, or it may suspend all trading in a particular 
stock. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d at 1285. See also § 8 of the 1933 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1964). 
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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in such a class action would go to those waging. the suit, the small 
litigant would be encouraged to sue.65 
A second consideration in the court's analysis was a recognition 
of the "potentially awesome injuries" that could follow from an 
award of punitive damages.66 The court reasoned that misstatements 
in violation of section 17(a) usually have a harmful effect on all 
those who read the prospectus containing those misstatements, and 
that the number of persons so harmed may be in the thousands. If 
all are permitted to recover punitive damages, the sum of the liabili-
ties could easily bankrupt an underwriter or issuer who erred in 
only one instance, but whose error affected many persons. The 
court stressed that punitive damages are usually awarded in situa-
tions in which there is only one injured party, thus enabling the 
amount recovered to be kept to a manageable level. 
The final argument that the court raised against punitive dam-
ages under section 17(a) was that such an award would create a 
dichotomy between the 1933 and 1934 Acts.67 The 1934 Act provides 
the only basis of relief for defrauded sellers, and the Second Circuit 
has held that section 28(a) bars punitive damages in actions brought 
under that Act.68 The court of appeals in Globus reasoned that to 
allow punitive damages under the 1933 Act would create an "un-
reasoned split" between the remedies available to buyers of securi-
ties and those available to sellers, when both have been subjected 
to equally fraudulent conduct.69 
Of course, neither the opinion of the court of appeals in Globus 
nor the district court's decision in that case is actually determinative 
of the question whether punitive damages should be awarded under 
rule lOb-5 and the 1934 Act, since Globus dealt only with section 
17(a) of the 1933 Act. Nevertheless, the two opinions do crystallize 
the arguments on both sides of the general question whether puni-
tive damages should be awarded in the securities area. 
65. Since this incentive to sue is critical for the small litigant, the court's rationale 
may fail in those suits in which it is determined that a class action may not be main-
tained. Globus itself was such a case. See 418 F.2d at 1285 n.8, and text accompanying 
notes 74-75 infra. 
66. 418 F.2d at 1285. 
67. 418 F.2d at 1286. 
68. The court in Globus referred throughout its opinion to its decision in Green v. 
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), in which it held that punitive damages were 
not available under § l0(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964). 
69. The court's reasoning here appears to be a sort of "neither-shall-have-anything" 
approach, based on the view that it is better for both buyers and sellers to have nothing 
than for one class to have a remedy which the other does not possess. However, if 
deHaas prevails over Green with regard to l0b-5 actions. then the district court's 
opinion in Globus does not create a dichotomy but a consistency. 
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IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR 
VIOLATIONS OF RULE lOB-5 
The major arguments that have been advanced in favor of award-
ing punitive damages under rule IOb-5 focus on deterrence, incentive 
to sue, retribution, and providing an adequate legal remedy. In 
Globus, the Second Circuit argued that awards of compensatory 
damages to numerous plaintiffs in securities cases, along with the 
maintenance of class-action suits by small litigants, would serve to 
fulfill these functions.70 But this argument should not be accepted 
without careful scrutiny. 
First, since the over-all purpose of the Securities Acts is to pro-
tect investors, punitive damages may be necessary in some situations 
both in order to deter potential offenders and in order to deter past 
offenders from repeating their offense.71 As the district court in 
Globus pointed out, in the case of some offenses, limiting judgment 
to compensatory damages 
would require the offender to do no more than return the money 
which he had taken from the plaintiff. In the calculation of his ex-
pected profits, the wrongdoer is likely to allow for a certain amount 
of money which will have to be returned to those victims who ob-ject too vigorously, and he will be perfectly content to bear the 
additional cost of litigation as the price for continuing his illicit 
business. It stands to reason that the chances of deterring him are 
materially increased by subjecting him to the payment of punitive 
damages.72 
A requirement that a wrongdoer disgorge his profits when his of-
fense is discovered has little deterrent value if he can still engage in 
his misconduct with impunity most of the time. In addition, even 
though many persons may be affected by a misstatement in a pros-
pectus, it is not often that a large percentage of those who are so 
affected will bring suit, because of the limited injury actually suf-
fered as a result of the misstatement. Thus, there may be situations 
in which any real deterrent effect can come only from the possibility 
of a punitive-damage award. 
Even in situations in which the potential liability under rule 
IOb-5 for compensatory damages is great because of the cumulative 
adverse effect that a misstatement has had on hundreds of victims, 
there still may be a valid reason other than deterrence for awarding 
punitive damages. It is arguable that punitive damages should be 
available in some cases in order to induce a victim of a I0b-5 violation 
70. 418 F .2d at 1285. 
71. For a general statement of the deterrence rationale in other situations, see 
Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive 
Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1158, 1169 (1966). 
72. 287 F. Supp. at 195, citing Judge Fuld, in Walker v. Sheldon, IO N.Y.2d 401, 406, 
179 N.E.2d 497, 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1961). 
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to enforce his rights and to bring the wrongdoer to justice.73 Not 
every case which is based on rule I0b-5 is suitable for the mainte-
nance of a class action, the panacea suggested by the Second Circuit 
in Globus.74 Indeed, the Globus suit itself provides an example. Al-
though it was originally initiated as a class action, the trial judge 
subsequently determined that it was improper for the suit to be 
maintained as a class action.75 In such cases in which class actions 
are not appropriate and in which the actual damage to any particular 
individual is slight, a possible award of punitive damages may be the 
only possible means of inducing the commencement of private ac-
tions under rule l0b-5. 
It is important to encourage private actions because they are the 
main source of enforcement for the Securities Acts. The criminal 
sanctions provided in section 32 of the 1934 Act for IOb-5 viola-
tions76 are so rarely invoked that they probably have little deterrent 
or punitive effect.77 Moreover, the SEC has only limited resources 
which it can use to enforce the Securities Acts.78 Unless private par-
ties are given some inducement to find out whether they have been 
wronged, and some incentive to initiate action if they discover they 
have been harmed, most violators of the securities laws will go un-
punished. 79 In a situation in which criminal penalties are invoked, 
73. Wather 8: Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kirk v. Combs, 49 MARQ. 
L. REv. 369, 382 (1965). 
74. 418 F.2d at 1285. 
75. 418 F.2d at 1285 n.8. 
76. 15 u.s.c. § 78ff (1964). 
77. Professor Loss cites only two recent cases in which there have been convictions 
for failure to file ownership reports under § 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act: 
United States v. Guterma, 281 F.2d 742, 745, 747-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 
(1960); and United States v. Orovitz, SEC Securities Exchange Act Litig. Rel. No. 4148 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1968). In addition, he cites only one conviction under rule 15cl-5 of 
the Securities Exchange Commission: United States v. Grossman, SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Litig. Rel. No. 3097 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 1964) ($100 fine on nolo contendere 
plea). 3 L. Loss, SEcuRmES REGULATION 1994 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, SECUIUTlllS 
REGULATION 4138 (Supp. 1969). 
78. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), involving a violation of the SEC's 
proxy rules, in which the Supreme Court stated: 
The Commission advises that it examines over 2,000 proxy statements annually and 
each of them must necessarily be expedited. Time does not permit an independent 
examination of the facts set out in the proxy material and this results in the Com-
mission's acceptance of the representations contained therein at their face value, 
unless contrary to other material on file with it. 
377 U.S. at 432. 
79. In the antitrust area, a former assistant attorney general of the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division acknowledged that "[i]f you did away with the treble damage 
suit entirely, and you still wanted substantial enforcement in order to have economic 
freedom, you would have to quadruple the size of the Antitrust Division." Hearings 
on H.R. 3108 B!!fore the Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 15 (1951) quoted in Barber, 
Private Enforcl!ment of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience, 30 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181, 183-84 n.10 (1961). 
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however, an additional award of punitive damages in a civil action 
is probably not justified on grounds of deterrence or retribution, 
since either remedy alone would be sufficient to accomplish these 
broad policy goals. But such situations can be handled on a case-by-
case basis. If defendants in civil proceedings can show that criminal 
penalties are pending against them, and if punitive damages are 
being considered in such proceedings, appropriate instructions can 
be given to the jury to disregard the factors of deterrence and retri-
bution in their assessment of damages. In such a case, the jury would 
also have to make a determination whether or not the plaintiffs were 
induced to bring suit by the possibility of obtaining punitive dam-
ages. Juries traditionally make similar determinations and weigh 
similar factors in assessing guilt and awarding damages in other areas; 
therefore, no special problems should be presented by the mere fact 
that the securities laws are involved. 
An additional consideration in support of punitive damages is 
that in cases in which individual compensatory damages are small 
and class actions cannot be maintained, an award of punitive dam-
ages can provide an effective legal remedy to the injured party. 
Punitive damages can accomplish this function by compensating the 
victim, in addition to his limited actual damages, for intangible 
costs--such as attorneys' fees and the embarrassment and trouble of 
bringing suit-which would not be recoverable if punitive damages 
were not awarded.80 It has been argued that if additional compensa-
tion is sought for attorneys' fees and mental injuries, then the legis-
lature, not the courts, should enlarge the package of damages which 
are available to plaintiffs under the securities laws.81 This argument 
is not completely valid in the context of rule l0b-5, however, since 
suits based on that rule are implied actions and are not specifically 
authorized by statute. In those sections of the 1934 Act in which 
Congress expressly faced the question, it did authorize awards for 
attorneys' fees and litigation costs.82 But Congress could not have 
done so with respect to lOb-5 damage actions, since it did not ex-
pressly authorize or define the suit in the first place. Thus, unless 
Congress gives the IOb-5 action specific authorization, plaintiffs can 
80. See the district court's opinion in Globus, 287 F. Supp. at 195. See also, Note, 
The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, 1162-63 (1966). 
81. See Note, supra note 80, at 1162-63. One fear is that juries sometimes award huge 
and perhaps capricious amounts of damages. See, e.g., Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
130 (1957), involving the libel of a public figure, in which the jury awarded punitive 
damages of $3 million, an award that was subsequently reduced by the trial court 
to $400,000. The court in Green expressed concern over this problem of arbitrarily 
large awards of punitive damages. 406 F.2d at 303 n.18. 
82. 1934 Act § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964), and 1934 Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) 
(1964). 
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recover attorneys' fees and intangible costs only if the courts enlarge 
the damage remedy under the now-existing implied civil action. 
From an evaluation of the arguments for and against punitive 
damages, it can be seen that there are situations in which an award 
of punitive damages would be particularly appropriate. Yet it is evi-
dent from these same arguments that punitive damages are not called 
for in all IOb-5 private actions. An examination of two factual situa-
tions will help illustrate the type of case in which an award of 
punitive damages would be appropriate. The first situation, which 
has been described earlier, involves the corporate insider who inten-
tionally and deliberately acts in violation of the provisions of rule 
IOb-5.88 That situation involves what might be termed "aggravated 
scienter."84 The insider knows that he is taking advantage of his 
position, knows that he is lying, and knows that he is violating the 
securities laws. The second situation, however, is not so clear. As-
sume that a corporate officer who has issued some misleading infor-
mation tells his brother-in-law in a social setting: "You ought to buy 
stock in X corporation now and sell in two weeks." The brother-in-
law follows the tip and makes a considerable profit. He neither 
issued the misleading information nor knew that false information 
had been issued by someone else. Indeed, his purchase was based 
simply on blind faith in his brother-in-law's informal advice. Never-
theless, as a "tippee," he may have violated rule lOb-5,85 just as the 
corporate insider did when he issued the misleading information. 
The tippee's conduct, however, cannot be called "willful" and "wan-
ton." In the first situation, punitive damages would be appropriate 
to punish the intentional wrongdoer, to discourage a repetition of 
the wrongful conduct, and to deter others from acting in a similar 
manner. But in the second situation, involving the tippee's liability, 
although compensatory damages would be proper in order to repay 
those who were defrauded at the expense of one who had no right 
to the profits, punitive damages would not be warranted under tradi-
tional tort theory because the law does not utilize punitive damages 
to deter and punish unintentional ·wrongs.86 
There is some indication that the deHaas rule would distinguish 
between the two situations. The court in deHaas limited its holding 
that punitive damages may be awarded to those IOb-5 cases which 
83. See text at p. 1609 supra. 
84. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., !!02 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D. Colo. 1969). 
85. The tippee's liability under IOb-5 is not yet clear. The question was left open 
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd. in part, revd. 
in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand 38 U.S.L.W. 2458 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 
1970). 
86. See W. PROSSER, I.Aw OF TORTS 9-10 (3d ed. 1964). See note 2 supra and accom-
panying text. 
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involve aggravated scienter.87 Certainly the deHaas factual situation, 
in which an insider issued false information in order to bring about 
a merger, involved aggravated scienter and was therefore an appro-
priate case for punitive damages. If the deHaas court intended to 
award punitive damages only after applying some test of aggravated 
scienter, or after requiring a showing that the conduct involved a 
"high degree of moral culpability," "wanton dishonesty," "moral 
turpitude," "gross fraud and deceit upon the public," and a "wan-
ton indifference to one's obligations," as did the district court in 
Globus,88 then deHaas indicates that punitive damages can, as a 
matter of policy, be awarded in appropriate cases in the securities 
area. Under this view, the determination whether a case is appro-
priate for punitive damages could be made through an application 
of general tort principles. This approach seems to be the most 
reasonable one. Of course, exactly what constitutes aggravated sci-
enter would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, although 
certainly that term should be applied to a defendant who intention-
ally makes misleading statements and should not be applied to the 
tippee whose violation of I0b-5 is unintentional. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Statutory analysis provides no clear answer to the question 
whether punitive damages should be awarded under rule IOb-5. 
The 1934 Act can be read without strain, and in conformity with 
congressional policy, to reach either conclusion. Although there does 
seem to be a congressional policy of avoiding punitive damages in 
the securities area,89 the courts have also discovered that there is a 
basic congressional intent to effectuate the enforcement of the Secu-
rities Acts90 and that in certain situations only punitive damages can 
effectuate that intent. 
Within the particular factual setting of the deHaas case-a case 
in which a showing of aggravated scienter was made, in which crim-
inal penalties were not also invoked, and in which recovery of actual 
damages was rather low-the court's award of punitive damages for 
the violation of rule I0b-5 fulfilled the broad policy goal of protect-
ing the investor. In such situations, punitive damages accomplish 
that goal by deterring and punishing the offender and by providing 
87. 302 F. Supp. at 649. The court cited Presser's notion that in order for punitive 
damages to be awarded by a court, " ••• there must be circumstances of aggravation or 
outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the 
defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that 
this conduct may be called willful or wanton" (footnotes omitted). See PROSSER, supra 
note 2, at 9-10. 
88. 287 F. Supp. at 194. 
89. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text. 
90. See notes 70-88 supra and accompanying text. 
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an adequate recovery to compensate the victim and to induce him 
to bring the offender to justice. Thus, while it is clear that in some 
cases punitive damages may be unnecessary and potentially over-
burdensome, it seems that in other cases they are necessary and ap-
propriate for the enforcement of congressional policy in the secu-
rities area. Therefore, an absolute prohibition against punitive 
damages, such as that adopted by the Second Circuit in Green, would 
seem to be an unfortunate policy. The better policy would be to 
weigh all the factors on a case-by-case approach, much as the dis-
trict courts did in deHaas and Globus, and to allow the juries to 
award punitive damages in appropriate cases. 
At this point in time, however, it is unclear whether punitive 
damages are a weapon in the arsenal of remedies available to plain-
tiffs under the Securities Acts.91 The court of appeals opinion in the 
Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation92 has failed to settle the issue, since 
the opinion handed down by the Second Circuit in that litigation 
expressly reserved for the district court's determination the question 
of what remedy should be applied.93 If the private actions seeking 
punitive damages which are now pending in that controversy94 
ultimately reach the United States Supreme Court, there will prob-
ably be a final determination concerning the general availability of 
punitive damages for violations of rule IOb-5. It is submitted that in 
appropriate cases, such damages should be made available to de-
frauded investors. 
91. The deHaas decision was not appealed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in Globus. 397 U.S. 913 (1970). 
92. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), afjd. in part, 
revd. in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), on remand, 38 U.S.L.W. 2458 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 
1970). 
93. 401 F.2d at 863. It is arguable that the Second Circuit later reversed itself and 
took the position of absolutely prohibiting punitive damages. See Green v. '\V'olf Corp., 
406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968). But see note 32 supra. 
94. See, e.g., Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); 
Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 38 U.S.L.W. 2240 (D. Utah, Oct. 17, 1969). 
